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THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AN
INSTANCE OF URBAN ENVIRONMENTAL
INEQUITY IN TIJUANA, MEXICO
Tseming Yang*
INTRODUCTION

Much of the literature about the environmental justice movement has focused on the domestic face of environmental equity
problems. Yet, issues of environmental equity also appear abroad.
The case of Metales y Derivados, an abandoned lead smelter in
Tijuana, Mexico, and the impacts it has had on its surrounding
community, Colonia Chilpancingo, illustrate environmental inequity vividly. This essay looks at the events that led to the current
situation and what implications Metales may have for addressing
issues of environmental justice at international and domestic levels.
I.

METALES Y DERIVADOS

Metales y Derivados is a former open-air lead smelting operation located in Tijuana, Mexico. 1 It is located only a few miles from
the U.S.-Mexico border, and within an easy commute from San
Diego.
The primary business of Metales had been recycling used car and
boat batteries and other lead scrap for lead and valuable metals.
Most of the input materials came from the United States. After
years of operation, however, Metales was left to its own devices by
its owners in 1995.
Metales had been operated by its San Diego based U.S. parent
company, New Frontier Trading, and the shareholders, Jose Kahn
and his family, in violation of various Mexican environmental regulations for a number of years. Many surrounding residents attributed respiratory problems, skin rashes, and even birth defects to
the pollution emissions of Metales.2 Even years after the facility
stopped operating, a study of area children found elevated blood
* Professor of Law, Vermont Law School.
1. For an official account of some of these events, see Metales y Derivados Final
at
Factual Record (SEM-98-007) [hereinafter Metales Factual Record], available
67
(last
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=
visited Jan. 26, 2002).
2. See Petition Before the Commission for EnvironmentalCooperation, Under Articles 13, 14, and 15 of the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation,
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lead levels. 3 When Metales had failed to comply with a number of
notices of violation, the Mexican government shut down the facility, filed criminal charges, and then issued a criminal arrest warrant
for Jose Kahn. Kahn then abandoned the facility and returned, unscathed, to the United States.
What Kahn left behind were several thousand cubic meters of
soil contaminated with lead, other heavy metals, thousands of broken plastic battery casings. Much of it was spread out over a several. acre site. In place of the former smelting operation facility,
there is now only a building skeleton of steel beams with hundreds
of sacks and drums containing lead smelter slag.4
For almost a decade, residents from the surrounding community
have demonstrated and lobbied government agencies on both sides
of the border and the Kahns to clean up Metales. Other than some
half-hearted measures, such as fencing and plastic tarps to cover
some of the wastes, little has been done. Meanwhile rain and wind
have carried lead-laden dust and soil from the site into Colonia
Chilpancingo, a community just a few hundred yards downhill.
Solutions to the toxic waste remain elusive. A Mexican government study found that even site stabilization-capping the site with
asphalt to prevent more of the heavy metals from being carried offsite by the elements-will cost almost $1 million. Removal and disposal of the contaminated soils from the site, a more thorough and
environmentally responsible clean-up program that would be safer
from a long-term perspective, would cost about $7 million.
Since Mexico has no toxic waste clean-up program equivalent to
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") Superfund,
government officials have never attempted any publicly financed
efforts to address the contamination. Instead, they have maintained that clean-up remains the responsibility of New Frontier
Trading and Jose Kahn. Unfortunately, Kahn has not set foot back
in Mexico, making any efforts of holding him responsible there
unlikely.
Despite this bleak picture, the community has been able to
achieve some successes. The community's situation is relatively
well known among those working on issues dealing with the border
environment. It has been the subject of an investigation and a facby Environmental Health Coalition [hereinafter EHC Petition], available at http://
www.environmentalhealth.org/CEC3.html#Petition (last visited Jan 26, 2003).
3. Metales Factual Record, supra note 1, at 8, 38-41.
4. Tseming Yang, Of Borders, Fences, and Global Environmentalism, 4 CHI. J. OF
INT'L L. 237, 240 (2003).
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tual record endorsed by the environment ministers of the three
North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") nations.5
That official factual record, released in 2002, confirmed the community's claims not only with respect to environmental mismanagement but also governmental failures to respond to the
problems. News articles documenting the situation have appeared
in the Wall Street Journal,6 Los Angeles Times,7 Washington Post,8
and the San Diego Union Tribune,9 as well as on National Public
Radio.10 A 1999 EPA Environmental Justice Advisory Council
conference on border environmental justice issues focused attention on Metales and introduced both Mexican and U.S. environmental officials to the situation." In the summer of 2003, Victor
Lichtinger, then head of the Mexican environmental ministry,
made promises to act. Unfortunately, not more than a month later,
Lichtinger was dismissed from his job by Mexican President
Vincente Fox. Nevertheless, the attention Metales has garnered
over the years has led members of the Mexican parliament to consider legislation creating a clean-up fund for abandoned hazardous
waste sites, similar to the U.S. Superfund.
II.

METALES, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND COMMUNITY JUSTICE

Metales y Derivados might be seen as an aberration-a cautionary tale of what happens when the environmental regulatory system fails.
Yet, many environmentalists and especially
environmental justice activists would find such a view too

optimistic.
There can be little doubt that the impacts on the community and
the environment were likely exacerbated by Metales' particular circumstances. It was a relatively small operation that appeared to
5. Metales Factual Record, supra note 1.
6. Marc Lifsher, Groups Use Nafta in Move To Clean Up Border Plant,WALL ST.
J., Oct. 21, 1998, at CAL.
7. Ken Ellingwood, California and the West: Mexico Accused of Failure to Clean
Up Plant Environment: Groups on both sides of border hope NAFTA agreement will

lead to removal of lead slag and debris near homes, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1998, at 3.
8. Kevin Sullivan, A Toxic Legacy on the Mexican Border, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
2003, at A17.
9. Joe Cantlupe, Toxic Tijuana Waste Site Corrodes Faith in NAFTA, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., May 13, 2000, at Al.
10. All Things Considered (National Public Radio, radio broadcast, Oct. 21, 1998).
11. Nat'l Envtl. Justice Advisory Council, Border Envtl. Justice Report, Unheard
Voices from the Border: A Report on Environmental Justice in the U.S.-Mexico Border

Region from the Past to the Future (Aug. 19-21, 1999), availableat http://www.epa.gov/
Compliance/resources/publications/ej/nejac-ej-border-report.pdf (last visited July, 24,
2003).
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have been run on a shoe-string budget and with little environmental sophistication. It seems unlikely that large industrial operations
would violate Mexican environmental regulations as blatantly as
did Metales.
It is the government's response, however, that is most revealing.
Rather than vigorously pursuing what might be perceived as a "bad
apple," government agency responses were less than aggressive.12
Unfortunately, environmental justice advocates are all too familiar
with such reactions.
A.

Metales as a Traditional Environmental Problem

Metales is one of the very scenarios that environmentalists
feared when NAFTA 3 was being negotiated and adopted. Environmentalists objected to NAFTA as potentially allowing not only
for the subversion of American environmental standards but also
for the exportation of pollution and toxics to the South. The assumption was that ever-present pressure for competitive businesses
to lower the cost of production and operation would surely lead
them to prefer operating in jurisdictions where environmental regulations were more lenient and standards lower. Reduced regulatory compliance expenses would contribute 1 4to lower overall
operating costs, thus making it easier to profit.
To address some of these concerns, the Mexican government restructured its environmental regulatory system to raise standards
to those of its NAFTA partners. Furthermore, the NAFTA parties
adopted an environmental side agreement, the North American
Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, designed to ensure
that the parties would properly enforce and implement their environmental laws as written. 5 To date, assessments of NAFTA's en12. For a more general discussion of Metales and the citizen submission process
under the North American Commission, see Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the
Citizen Submission Process of the North American Environmental Commission: A
Case Study of the Metales y Derivados Matter (Apr. 17, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
13. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. 32
I.L.M. 296 [hereinafter NAFTA].
14. See, e.g., John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH
AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION at 3-4 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox, eds. 2003); Ignacia S. Moreno, James W. Rubin, Russell F.
Smith III, & Tseming Yang, Free Trade and the Environment: The NAFTA, the
NAAEC, and Implications for the Future, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 405, 410-413 (1999).
15. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAAEC].
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vironmental consequences have yet to provide a clear picture.
Many of the most dire predictions about NAFTA's potential large
scale impact on the U.S. and Mexican environmental and regulatory systems appear to have been wrong. Metales, however, is a
glimpse of the other side.
From a traditional environmental perspective, the regulatory and
enforcement failures of Metales could be the consequence of the
regulatory capture of Mexico's environmental ministries by industrial development interests. Even if the owners of Metales were
not powerful political players who could influence the Mexican bureaucracy, industrial development issues have generally had much
greater weight in affecting regulatory policy and enforcement priorities than advocates for environmental protection, public health,
and marginalized communities. Thus, the regulatory enforcement
system might have failed the residents of Colonia Chilpancingo because of the undue influence on and consideration by regulators of
industrial development interests.
The other way of explaining the Mexican government's enforcement decisions is not as a failure of regulatory decision-making but
as the expression of current regulatory priorities. Even absent influence by special interests, it has been widely known that one of
16
the top governmental priorities has been economic development.
If government policies are primarily focused on promoting industrial development and job creation, the deterrent effects and longterm consequences of tough enforcement actions on foreign investors might be undesirable. Tougher enforcement can suggest not
only greater government attention to regulatory compliance, but
also presents the possibility of an improper assertion of
prosecutorial powers. Either way, the additional cost to the bottom line may significantly affect the cost of operation and thus the
profitability of a business.
The unfortunate consequence of such priorities could certainly
lead to the neglected welfare of communities such as Colonia
Chilpancingo. If rapid industrial development, job creation, and
poverty alleviation are the flip side to pollution and environmental
degradation, then pollution and environmental degradation can
seem not only acceptable but even necessary. The interests of
small communities must simply give way to the achievement of the
greater good. Disfavoring regulatory policies and actions that stifle
economic development goals might then result from the subversion
16. See, e.g., BARBARA
61-109 (1998).

HOGENBOOM, MEXICO AND THE

NAFTA

DEBATE
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of proper environmental regulatory processes by agency capture,
over-emphasis of economic development goals in policy-making, or
both.
B.

Metales: A Problem of Community and
Environmental Justice
Much of what happened at Metales has followed a pattern quite
familiar to community and environmental justice activists.17
Rather than being exceptional, it can be seen as an example of environmental injustice encountered in many communities of color
and the poor.
Like communities protesting issues of environmental injustice in
the United States, the population living around Metales is poor, of
color, and socially marginalized. The lead wastes and used batteries that Metales was recycling came primarily from the wealthy
neighbor to the North-the United States. Environmental regulators in Mexico have been slow or failed completely to respond to
the complaints and needs of the community. U.S. environmental
regulators have disclaimed most responsibility, instead pointing to
the Mexican government as the primary regulator. More effort has
been spent on governmental finger-pointing as to who should clean
up the mess than on concrete remedial action.
Colonia Chilpancingo is certainly not the only community that
has needs worthy of governmental attention. Delaying responses
in favor of more pressing priorities or other communities may be
unavoidable. Likewise, the possibility of regulatory failures remains present regardless of how diligent and committed regulatory
officials appear. With respect to communities of color, the poor,
and other marginalized populations, however, the events at
Metales acquire a different meaning.
Considering the marginalized status of communities such as
Colonia Chilpancingo, the regulatory and enforcement failures at
Metales seem consistent with the overall treatment of this community by the governments. Neglect of such communities to pollution
and public health concerns is no less surprising than neglect in
other respects. The reality of Colonia Chilpancingo and many
other U.S.-Mexico border cities is that it is marginal not only from
a geographical perspective, but also a social and political one. Neg17. See, e.g., LUKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
(2000); CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS
(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
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lect of the community's needs is a manifestation of the community's lack of political influence and significance within the
Mexican political system. Such communities are not only at the
geographical margins of the state, they are also at the margins of
society itself.
With the U.S. government's lack of accountability to these communities, the communities' disenfranchisement is complete. Even
though Metales is owned by a U.S. parent company and U.S. citizens, the U.S. government has taken no direct responsibility or accountability to the community just across the border. Colonia
Chilpancingo has had little political influence over the actions of
U.S. government agencies.
Like many inner-city communities in the United States, lack of
political influence of the poor and disenfranchised border community makes it difficult to obtain remedial assistance with environmental problems. Marginalized communities do not have effective
tools to hold their governmental representatives in Mexico City
and Washington, D.C. accountable.
Il1.

THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIP

Metales makes the transnational aspects of environmental injustice visible. Unlike the externalization of environmental problems
from developed countries to developing nations, for example
through the export of wastes or the relocation of polluting industries to continents thousands of miles away, Metales is located
within a stones -throw from the United States and thus easily discoverable to those living here.
The most obvious link is the origin of the raw materials themselves. Much of the lead wastes, including the used car and boat
batteries, came from the United States. Laxer environmental regulation and enforcement made it profitable for the Metales owners
to operate the smelter in Tijuana, Mexico. The effect was to export
the pollution externalities of reprocessing the lead wastes through
outdated, dirtier, and more polluting methods, to Mexico. The
profits of such dirty lead reclamation operations were repatriated
to the United States.
Another link is the program of trade liberalization that directly
enabled operations such as Metales. Metales was set up under the
Mexican maquiladora plant program. Maquiladora status has allowed companies from the United States and elsewhere to set up
operations and import raw materials to the Mexican side of the
border area under special tax treatment. For the United States,
HeinOnline -- 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1327 2003-2004
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this has meant cheaper consumer goods. For the Mexican economy, such operation has brought jobs and economic development.
For foreign businesses it has created access to a pool of labor
within close proximity to the U.S. market, but at much lower
costs. 18 For Colonia Chilpancingo, it has meant an industrial neighbor that violated environmental regulations, imposed serious pollution burdens on them, and arguably created a significant public
health risk.
Even the aftermath of the Metales problem continues to have
transnational reverberations. The owner of Metales, Jose Kahn,
abandoned the facility and retreated across the border to his San
Diego home. Using the border as a shield from Mexican enforcement actions and from the criminal arrest warrant the Mexican
government filed against him, Kahn has lived in San Diego largely
undisturbed by the consequences of the Metales mess. Occasional
demonstrations by community activists were the only exceptions.
On the U.S. side, U.S. EPA officials have had relatively little direct involvement with Metales despite numerous requests by community activists. Because the facility itself was physically located in
Mexico, U.S. environmental laws generally do not apply to the operations there. Moreover, without an extradition request from the
Mexican government, there seems to be little that the U.S. government can do on its side of the borders to assist the Mexican officials
in their enforcement efforts. 19
Finally, Metales exposes the deficiencies of supra-national organizations in filling the gaps left by national failures. Organizations
such as the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("CEC"), which is tasked with supervising the NAFTA environmental side agreement, and institutions operating at the U.S.Mexico border, such as the North American Development Bank
("NADBank") and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission ("BECC"), 20 have provided little substantive assistance in
spite of their interest in transnational environmental problems.
With the exception of approximately $85,000 allocated by the EPA
18. See generally

LESLIE SKLAIR, ASSEMBLING FOR DEVELOPMENT: THE MA-

(1993).
19. Kahn was prosecuted by the Los Angeles County District Attorney for exporting lead wastes to Tijuana in violation of California environmental laws in 1992. Although he paid a $50,000 fine, Kahn's sentence was suspended. See generally YANG,
supra note 12.
20. Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environmental Cooperative Commission and North American Development Bank, Nov. 16-18, 1993, U.S.Mex., T.I.A.S. No 12516.
QUILA INDUSTRY OF MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES
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as seed money toward a study on future cleanup, funding or other
substantive assistance21 to remediate the contamination at Metales
remains outstanding.
IV.

JUSTICE FOR ALL COMMUNITIES-AT HOME AND ABROAD

Metales is not an isolated example of the difficulties that
marginalized international communities face in achieving environmental justice. Communities elsewhere, in the United States and
abroad, face similar challenges. Understanding what happened at
Metales not only provides a better understanding of the causes of
environmental inequity and injustice but also points out pathways
toward solutions.
First, even though the problems at Metales may appear in a different context and are located in another country, they are fundamentally similar to those faced by minorities and the poor in the
United States. The dynamic of political and economic powerlessness are the root of both, and the degradation of environmental
quality and public health are the same.
Metales also suggests that urban environmental justice in developing countries constitutes a set of equity issues apart from concerns of intergovernmental environmental inequity between
developing and developed countries-so-called North-South equity issues. Assertions by developing country governments that economic development is a national priority that supplants needs for
environmental protections should be considered with caution. Poverty alleviation, jobs, and raising the standard of living are clearly
important goals. Most nations, including developing countries,
however, are not monolithic in the interests that their citizens hold.
Likewise, the benefits of economic development are usually not
evenly distributed throughout a society. In fact, societal groups
that may be least benefited by industrial development, the poor
and other marginalized groups, often also bear the greatest burden
of pollution and environmental degradation. National priorities
cannot be set in isolation from community interests in public health
and environmental protection, nor can they be claimed as mutually
exclusive.
In countries that are not fully democratic, however, where racial
or ethnic minorities are granted few special protections, or where
corruption and graft are pervasive and the rule of law must still be
21. Sandra Dibble, EPA Grant to Help Otay Revive Abandoned Smelting Operation, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 27, 2004, at B3.
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strived towards, government accountability for considering distributional equity issues becomes an even greater issue. The need for
democratization and the implementation of human rights must go
hand in hand with economic development and efforts to protect
the environment. In other words, community justice issues cannot
be cordoned off from international concern and left solely within
the discretion of a national government.
International environmental institutions have accomplished little
in this regard. Metales suggests how poorly the design of international environmental institutions address issues of community justice. Their inability to provide substantive solutions to the
contamination suggests that organizations operating at the intergovernmental level are not suited to address equity and justice issues at the community level. The fact that their structure makes
them accountable to states alone, and not to communities directly,
makes it likely that they will act only when and to the extent that
member governments are interested in allowing it.
There is also another lesson that Metales teaches-process alone
cannot protect marginalized communities. The contamination at
Metales has existed for almost a decade since it was abandoned.
Community activists have sought to utilize the political process and
lobbied government agencies; yet no substantive government remedy has come forth. They filed a petition with the CEC, which resulted in a factual record that demonstrates not only the serious
environmental problems of the site but also Mexico's enforcement
failures. Nevertheless, no governmental agency has come forward
with a substantive remedy for the Colonia Chilpancingo residents.
Metales has been an open secret for years. Hence, regulatory failures cannot be attributed to inadvertence or lack of information.
Instead, it is more likely the result of a lack of willingness to act.
The effectiveness of political and other public processes designed
to shame and pressure government agencies into acting is limited.
Without substantive environmental rights there is no legal right
and obligation that can be asserted or enforced on behalf of communities. Their position and claims are accordingly weakened.
Finally, Metales also shows the need for cross-border coalitionbuilding. Just as businesses and governments may act across borders as transnational corporations, or by using international governmental organizations, so must community activists and
organizers do the same. Only through cross-border organizing and
activism can communities provide a counterweight to globalization
trends. In the Metales case, activists from the San Diego-based
HeinOnline -- 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1330 2003-2004
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Environmental Health Coalition ("EHC") were instrumental in assisting residents from Colonia Chilpancingo in bringing their concerns to the attention of the U.S. EPA and also to the CEC. While
a substantive remedy for Metales remains elusive, such cross-border work has been invaluable in moving toward such a goal.
The EHC's work confirms something else for the border region.
Just as the environment may be interconnected, so are the communities on both sides through family, ethnic, economic, political, and
cultural ties that cannot be artificially severed by a political border.
Cross-border coalition-building is a way not just of strengthening
community power but also affirming their shared interests and ties
to each other.
CONCLUSION

Even though many of the events leading up to the environmental
calamity at Metales took place in Mexico, Metales is not a selfcontained, local instance of environmental injustice. A closer look
at what happened there exposes many links to the United States.
They demonstrate both how instances of urban environmental injustice are connected to larger patterns of inequity, trade, and pollution transfers that cross international boundaries. They also
demonstrate how these patterns resemble the market and political
dynamics that have led to instances of urban environmental inequity in the United States. Addressing problems of urban environmental equity not just in the United States but also in other parts
of the world will require consideration of these associations and
patterns.
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